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THE WARREN COURT, LEGALISM, AND DEMOCRACY:
Sketch for a Critique in a Style Learned from Morton Horwitz
William H. Simon

Morton Horwitz’s Transformation books developed a critical
approach that elaborates the underlying premises of legal doctrine and
compares them to suppressed or ignored alternative perspectives.
However, Horwitz’s Warren Court book is largely an appreciation of the
Court’s doctrine that accepts at face value its underlying premises and
the judges’ claim to vindicate democratic values. In this essay, I
speculate on what a Transformation-style critique of the Warren Court
might look like and suggest that the Court is vulnerable to criticisms
analogous to those the Transformation books make of earlier doctrine. I
suggest that book ignores an alternative perspective on social justice
that emerged clearly after the Warren Court era but was conceptually
available during it.
Surely the most consistent theme in Morton Horwitz’s work is
the critical portrayal of the evasion of substantive justice in legal
discourse. Time and again, Horwitz has explicated legal argument as a
series of elaborately contrived detours away from questions of
distributive fairness, equality, and solidarity that, to the professionally
unencumbered mind, shriek for attention.
Horwitz’s book on the Warren Court is an exception.1 The book
is largely a celebration of the Court’s, and especially Justice Brennan’s,
achievements and an appreciation of the unfulfilled promise of their
more ambitious pronouncements.
Yet, Horwitz has elsewhere
acknowledged that the Warren Court was not immune to the temptations
of evasion he analyzed in the rest of his work or in particular to three
intellectual vices he often associated with it – formalism, individualism,
and proceduralism.2 I refer to these vices collectively as "legalism".
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Without disagreeing with Horwitz’s portrayal of the positive
dimension of the Warren Court, I want to discuss some elements of a
Horwitzian critique of the Court. Such a critique would suggest that the
doctrinal retreats and practical failings of the post-Warren Supreme
Court were foreshadowed and enabled by the presence in the Warren
Court's own cases of the vices of formalism, individualism, and
proceduralism.
I focus on crude but probably uncontroversial stories about the
development and practical application of three critical areas of Warren
Court doctrine – race discrimination, criminal justice, and welfare rights.
Each shows a trajectory of progressive promise and ultimate (but far
from total) disappointment.
In each case, the disappointment is clear only after the nominal
conclusion of the Warren Court in 1969. Thus, it is debatable whether it
is fair or illuminating to associate the practical failings with the earlier
doctrines. Perhaps the post-1969 developments occurred because of
political re-alignment and, had the Court’s personnel not changed,
doctrine would have evolved to address effectively the problems that
emerged. However, my intuition – for which I can offer only
impressionistic support here – is that the problems that later emerged can
be traced to legalist features of the early case law.3
The second element of a Horwitzian critique -- after the exposure
of the vices of legalism -- is the elaboration of an alternative perspective
on the issues in question that is suppressed in conventional narratives.
Sometimes the alternative is an actual perspective that preceded the
subject under scrutiny, such as the "just price" jurisprudence displaced
by 19th century contract law. Sometimes it is a hypothetical possibility - for example, subsidization of antebellum economic development
through the tax rather than the tort system. The function of recovering
the suppressed alternative is to emphasize the contingency of the
trajectory under focus (things could have gone differently) and to
sharpen our normative assessment of it (some features of the alternative
are comparatively attractive).
I close by invoking as an alternative to the Warren Court program
Horwitz celebrates the program implicit in the re-orientation in public
policy that occurred in the U.S. and the European Union in the 1990s
that is often called "new governance." Since it emerged clearly only
after the Warren Court era, it is empirically a subsequent alternative. But
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since there is no reason to think that the program was not conceptually
available during the Warren Court era, it could also be treated as a
hypothetical contemporaneous alternative. In any event, since the "new
governance" program competes today with approaches associated with
the Warren Court, the comparison is an important part of the assessment
of the Warren Court's legacy.
The contrast between "new governance" and Warren Court
implies broader issues about democracy. Horwitz showed that the
Warren Court doctrine was animated by a Progressive conception of
democracy. He portrays this vision as an attractive one, but he does not
consider whether it has any plausible rivals within the Progressive
tradition. I suggest that it does have a plausible rival.
I. Promise and Disappointment: Three Stories
A. Race Discrimination4
The Court launched its struggle against government racial
discrimination in Brown v. Board of Education by declaring de jure
segregated schools to violate constitutionally-mandated equal protection.
It applied the doctrine to other public services and facilities and to
electoral systems. After considerable delay, it encouraged judicial
intervention against a variety of forms of official resistance and evasion.
Congress complemented its activities with statutes prohibiting some
forms of private discrimination, including in employment, higher
education (where the institution received public funds), and housing.
These efforts contributed to the virtual eradication of open
deliberate discrimination in the public sector and a more gradual
reduction in the private sector. By the 1970s they had contributed to a
significant number of meaningfully integrated school systems, and they
had opened up new job and housing opportunities for relatively better-off
African Americans. But the gains seemed to come slowly; at some
point, they stalled, and in some areas – notably school desegregation –
there was severe regression.
Doctrinally, the key question was how anti-discrimination norms
would apply to racial disparities that were not provably the consequence
of intentional discrimination by particular defendants. The early success
of the civil rights movement shifted contest from “disparate treatment”
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cases to “disparate impact” cases. In the latter, the only proof of
discrimination was evidence that the challenged action had affected
minorities worse than whites. The challenged measures often seemed
highly likely or even certain to have been influenced by racism. On the
other hand, racism may not have been the only or the predominant
motivation. In principle, there were legitimate reasons for, say, using
traditional jurisdictional lines to draw school districts or requiring a high
school degree for a bus driving job. The fact that these actions
foreseeably disadvantaged blacks disproportionately did not necessarily
mean that they had been adopted for the purpose of creating the
disadvantage or that the arguably legitimate reason was not of substantial
weight. Since it would often be unfeasible to resolve such questions
conclusively, a lot depended on where the burden of proof was placed.
With the partial exception of statutory employment discrimination cases,
the court ultimately placed it squarely on plaintiffs.
More generally, the Court declined to interpret constitutional
equal protection as a broad prohibition on the state’s implication in
social structures of racial subordination, and instead interpreted narrowly
as a kind of intentional tort. It often demanded that the plaintiff show an
intentional injury caused by a specific act or practice of a particular
defendant. This imposed often insuperable burdens of proof (where, for
example, it was hard to isolate out the effects of discriminatory behavior
from other negative influences on the plaintiff) and sometimes precluded
effective relief (for example, in suburban school cases, interdistrict relief
was forbidden even where it was the only effective relief if the
culpability of all the districts could not be established).
B. Criminal Justice5
Elaborating the due process clause of the 14th amendment and
“incorporating” the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth amendments, the court
developed a series of doctrines designed to improve the fairness of the
treatment of relatively powerless people in the criminal justice system.
In particular, it prescribed constitutional restrictions mandating the
provision of minimally effective defense to indigents and restricting
coercive interrogation and search and seizure. It enforced the latter
through the “exclusionary rule” precluding admission of evidence
obtained in consequence of violation of the doctrines. It also developed
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a complex series of doctrines that facilitated more or less routine federal
court review of state court convictions.
The positive side of the Warren Court criminal justice story is
that these decisions helped to change practices in ways that benefitted
the people they were intended to benefit, and they contributed to a
notable general increase in the professionalism of law enforcement. But
the negative side is that, again, change was much less than intended.
Legislatures were stringy in funding public defenders, and the post-1969
Court cut back on the earlier doctrines in ways that limited their practical
effect.
Another part of the story involves the indirect undermining of
defendants’ protections. The Warren Court years were followed by a
time of massive middle class anxiety about rising crime and loss of
social control. Conservatives were successful in using crime control
issues to mobilize voters. In office, they devoted major effort to trying
to cut back the Warren Court doctrines, but their most successful project
was to legislate dramatic increases in punishment.
Prescribed
punishments, which the Warren Court had left virtually unregulated by
the Constitution, soared. This escalation in turn generated a great
increase in prosecutorial discretion, which the Court had also left largely
unregulated constitutionally. When threatened punishments go up, the
minimum probability of acquittal that would lead a defendant to choose
trial goes up as well. Even a small risk of a disastrous punishment will
induce many defendants to accept a plea bargain.
In the associated bargaining process, Warren Court procedural
claims are at best assets to be traded for reduced charges. They may
have significant value to the defendant, and the fact that prosecutors
must offer concessions for them may create some incentives that deter
the abusive practices that give rise to these claims. Nevertheless, the fact
that the potential sanctions are often higher than the prosecutor would
want to impose means that she can trade down without great cost.
Moreover, the procedural doctrines simply do not address the most basic
sources of unfairness in the system – excessive punishment and
unchecked prosecutorial discretion.
C. Welfare Administration6
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In the pre-1960s welfare system, street-level bureaucrats
exercised broad discretion, partly by design and partly as a consequence
of lax supervision. They sometimes used this discretion to tailor
assistance in ways that helped recipients; more often, they used it
arbitrarily and abusively.
The Court’s decision in Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) is often taken
to establish constitutional rule-of-law values in welfare programs. It
repudiated the “right-privilege” distinction in constitutional law, required
pre-termination hearings with respect to public assistance, and specified
the minimum requisites of such hearings. (As a narrow practical matter,
the key holding was the requirement of hearings prior to termination; the
Social Security Act had required hearings that would have satisfied the
other aspects of the decision since 1935.)
Welfare programs responded to Goldberg by creating or
strengthening corps of hearing officers independent of line
administration.
The officers typically had strong professional
credentials, sometimes as lawyers. The quality of their performance in
adjudicating recipient claims tended to be high. Civil legal aid
programs, which expanded during this period, often made substantial
efforts to provide representation to claimants in these hearings. The rate
of decisions in favor of recipients in these hearings was substantial, and
not only where the claimants were represented.
So far, so good. On the other hand, you cannot say, as you can
with criminal justice, that the Court’s decisions contributed to a general
professionalization of practice in the welfare area. The effects of
constitutional welfare jurisprudence were rigorously confined to the
realm of adjudication, and while that realm functioned well, only a small
fraction of cases ever reached it. With the major exception of the Social
Security Disability programs, appeal rates from negative case actions
remained very small. There is good reason to believe that a substantial
fraction of unappealed decisions were erroneous.
Most recipients’ fates were left to the realm of routine
administration. This realm was dramatically transformed, but not to the
benefit of recipients. In essence, administration was bureaucratized.
Discretion was squeezed out of the frontline worker’s job by detailed and
inflexible rules, Tayloristic supervision, and the redesign of the job to
exclude people with qualifications or aspirations as social workers.
Recipients were subjected less to coercive intrusion into their private
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lives and more to demands of paper-pushing and bureaucratic hoopjumping. Negative decisions were less likely to result from recipients’
private conduct and more likely to result from their failure to comply
with documentation or verification requirements or to comply with the
requirements of work or child support enforcement programs. In
essence, bureaucratic burdens on recipients were dramatically increased,
while both the capacity and the inclination of frontline workers to assist
them were reduced.
Administrators tended to insist that the spheres of adjudication
and line administration were mutually impervious. For example, they
instructed frontline workers that they were to ignore hearing decisions in
all cases other than the one in which it was handed down. An applicant
or recipient unfairly treated by line administration had a good chance of
getting relief if she could get her claim into the hearing process, but
many claimants were unable to do so, often because of the very kind of
misconduct the hearing process was supposed to protect against. The
Supreme Court squarely rejected arguments that due process might
impose requirements on line administrative practices in Schweiker v.
Hansen (1981) – a little known case that is as important as Goldberg.
Schweiker refused to recognize either as a matter of constitutional or
federal common law an estoppel principle that would afford relief to a
person who had been wrongly told by a line worker that she was
ineligible for benefits and in consequence, when she did file later, was
denied for failure to comply with timeliness requirements. Schweiker is
not a Warren Court case. It was decided in 1981, and Justices Marshall
and Brennan dissented. But the decision did not require overruling or
distinguishing any Warren Court decision. Those decisions were
focused on hearings, not line administration.
II. Critique
A. Formalism
Formalism is the privileging of semantics or abstract logic over
purpose and context.
The paradigmatic instance of modern
constitutional formalism is the invocation in the Burger and Rehnquist
eras of the Equal Protection Clause and Brown as authority against
affirmative action. However, I do not see this move as facilitated by any
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defect in the Warren Court decisions. Brown is explicitly about racial
classifications that cause stigmatic harm and implicitly about the
oppression of minority group members. Affirmative action is readily
distinguishable, and the later anti-affirmative action cases seem a strong
departure from Brown.•
I do not think we can say the same thing about the role of Warren
Court doctrine in grade school desegregation efforts. The Warren Court
education cases were ambiguous, and as things played out, they proved
compatible with various kinds of formalism that influenced both the right
and the left.
First, there was the formalism that defined discrimination solely
in terms of consciously and actively invidious official conduct, and thus
excluded conduct that passively accepted or unreflectively reproduced
social structures that were the product of private racism or were
generally perceived by both whites and blacks as implementing the
subordination of blacks. This understanding leaves de facto and
disparate-impact discrimination -- which for a long time has meant most
discrimination -- unredressed. It also meant that the remedy for past de
jure discrimination might consist of little more than a shift to facially
neutral practices that in fact involve very little effective integration.
Second, there was the formalism that measured desegregation in
terms of government efforts to achieve racial mixing without regard to
their results. At some point, the combination of housing segregation
•

On the other hand, Califano v. Goldfarb (1977), a Brennan opinion with
Marshall joining, strikes me as manifesting a formalism analogous to that of the antiaffirmative action opinions. The case held invalid a Social Security rule that provided
greater benefits to the dependent spouses of male wage earners than to those of female
wage earners. Unnoted in the decision is the fact that virtually its only practical effect
was to provide a class of male government employees with a second set of publiclyfinanced retirement benefits. (Few men employed in the private sector could qualify
for dependents’ benefits even after the decision because of the rule that a person gets
only the higher of his own Social Security benefits or the benefits he would be entitled
to as a dependent. Government employees up to that time were not covered by Social
Security; public pensions were designed to compensate for this exclusion.) The
discrimination the court struck down was clearly intended to benefit women dependents
and clearly did so. The court objected that it gave women wage-earners a lower return
on their contributions, but it is debatable whether that was the most plausible
perspective from which to view the program. See William H. Simon, “Rights and
Redistribution in the Welfare System,” 38 Stanford Law Review 1431, 1478-84 (1986).
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(unredressable because ostensibly the product of private decisions) and
the restriction on interdistrict remedies (forbidden unless invidious
discrimination could be proved against all districts) made it very hard to
achieve meaningful desegregation. Some lower federal courts insisted
on integration even in situations where such efforts were counterproductive (by producing chaos and white flight), and in majorityminority districts they labored desperately to contrive intricate decrees
that might attract white students from the suburbs. The Supreme Court
eventually condemned such decrees as ineffective.
Third, there was the formalism that interpreted equality as
satisfied by racial mixing and perhaps economically equal inputs without
regard to the quality of educatiion. When civil rights groups began to
split over the relative priority of what now appeared to be the at least
partially competing goals of desegregation and educational adequacy in
inner city schools, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
justified its strong pro-integration stance on the ground that it was
compelled by Warren Court precedent. Our responsibility is to vindicate
“constitutional standards”, its lawyers said, and those standards mandate
integration “wholly without regard to educational consequences.” 7
Consider now a formalist theme in the criminal procedure sphere.
Is the exclusionary rule entailed by the 4th and 5th amendments, or is it
simply one acceptable means a state can use in mitigating unreasonable
interrogation and search and seizure practices? The Warren Court
decisions were generally interpreted sympathetically by liberals and
harshly by conservatives as reflecting the first view. Conservatives have
criticized the decisions along precisely the lines that Arthur Corbin
criticized Samuel Williston’s categorical embrace of expectation
damages in contract law.8 They pointed out that the substantive rights in
question did not logically entail any particular remedy. They argued that
the rule had a limited effect on police conduct. (For example, it only
kicked in with investigations where charges were filed; it was widely
nullified by perjury in some jurisdictions.) There are many other,
perhaps more cost-effective, ways of protecting the relevant
constitutional rights – for example, requiring taping of confessions -- that
the court has never required. And like Corbin, the commentators pointed
to an underground of cases that tacitly deviated from the doctrine in
highly defensible ways (for example, permitting the use of tainted
material for impeachment).
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B. Individualism
“[O]ur legal system,” Horwitz has written, “is overwhelmingly
geared to a conception of redressing individual grievances, not of
vindicating group rights or of correcting generalized patterns of
injustice.”9
In substantive discrimination law, we see this orientation in the
tort approach that requires the plaintiff to show a specific injury to her
and to trace it to specific consciously invidious conduct by the defendant.
Such doctrines immunize a substantial measure of intentional
discrimination from liability by making the burdens of proof too high.
They limit the ability of group members to vindicate group interests.
And they disclaim any affirmative duty on the part of government to
remedy the effects of racial subordination that cannot be traced narrowly
to past wrongful official conduct.
In criminal justice and welfare, the individualist orientation is
reflected in the pre-occupation with “end-of-the-pipe” remediation
through individual claims for past wrongful conduct in adjudicatory
procedures. This orientation ignores or denies the “management side of
due process”.10 It fails to vindicate potential claims that cannot be raised
in the required form because the victim lacks the knowledge or resources
to do so. It encourages officials to bifurcate their practice between a
realm of “trouble cases” to which the prospect of judicial supervision
requires them to devote special attention and the realm of routine
administration where they do not anticipate having to account for their
treatment of the disadvantaged.
Of course, these problems are mitigated by the practice of
“structural injunction” that emerged from the convergence of class action
and equity practice under and after the Warren Court. Many have noted
that the development of these procedural doctrines has put pressure on
the individualist premises of substantive doctrine. At the same time,
however, substantive individualism constrains remedial practice. A
representative plaintiff who can show individual standing and prove an
officially condoned practice that violates a clear duty often gets
structural relief. But standing burdens are sometimes preclusive, and
where the complaint alleges not, deliberate violation of explicit duty, but
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failure to proactively monitor to prevent violations or to take effective
initiative to provide mandated benefits, systemic relief is often denied.
Here again, it is debatable how much these limitations are
grounded in Warren Court doctrine. Much of the relevant authority is
post-1969. Some have found a fairly radical innovation implicit in the
Warren Court’s equity practice in civil rights cases.11 But the “implicit”
qualification is important. Much of the case law is pre-occupied with
technical matters. It’s notable that when Abram Chayes conceptualized
the “public law action”, he relied hardly at all on Supreme Court cases
(other than recent ones cutting back on remedial practice) and credited
much of the innovation he discussed to lower court judges.12
C. Proceduralism
The most striking manifestation of Warren Court proceduralism
is in criminal justice. The exclusionary rule was indifferent to
substantive guilt or innocence. It was popularly believed to cause guilty
people to go free, and while the belief tended to be exaggerated, it was
not wrong. Most of the Warren Court precedents were undoubtedly
directly useful disproportionately to guilty people.
At the same time, the Warren Court made comparatively little or
no effort to subject to constitutional regulation: (1) the quantum of
evidence necessary to support a conviction; (2) prosecutorial discretion;
and (3) proportionately of punishment. There were clearly major
systemic abuses that could have been addressed under each of these
rubrics. The Court’s failure to develop substantive doctrinal checks put
more pressure on its procedural doctrines to remedy injustice in the state
criminal process. The Court developed the habeas remedy into a tool of
virtually routine review, but in principle the bases for review were
mostly procedural. Thus, defense lawyers had to squeeze claims of
injustice into procedural claims. (Two friends who volunteered to do
habeas appeals in the 1980s for clients they thought were innocent told
me very similar stories about oral arguments in which they sought to
inspire the panels to pay more attention to their routine procedural claims
by asserting that here was a case in which the claimants were probably
innocent and were told testily on each occasion to refrain from detouring
to “irrelevant” matters.) When Alan Dershowitz won a reversal of Claus
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von Bulow’s conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient
to support it, he plausibly described his strategy as daring and risky.13
The cost in terms of political legitimacy of criminal justice
proceduralism was enormous. Political demagoguery over crime control
readily focused on federal court doctrine, not just because of the myth
that it was freeing large numbers of criminals, but because of the tension
between the Court’s proceduralism and popular values of substantive
justice. One measure of this cost is the extent to which reformers
ultimately increased the political traction of their arguments when they
re-framed their critique of the system around substantive justice values –
or as they put it, “innocence.” A major landmark was the death penalty
moratorium declared in 2000 by the Republican governor of Illinois on
the expressed basis that it appeared that a substantial number of prisoners
on death row might be innocent. This move was clearly a departure from
the Warren Court approach.
The Warren Court’s approach to welfare was also proceduralist.
Race and gender issues aside, its main concerns were hearing rights.
Justice Brennan did apply the fleeting “irrebutable presumption” doctrine
to the food stamp program in U.S. v. Murray (1972), but that seed bore
little fruit. He and Justice Marshall dissented from the denial of the
equal protection claim about AFDC classifications in Dandridge v.
Williams (1970). Had the liberal justices prevailed, they would have
produced more rigorous requirements for programmatic classifications.
But even this would have been a far cry from a substantive requirement
to satisfy “minimum needs,” about which liberal lawyers theorized and
which a few state courts found in state constitutions. Moreover, what
was arguably the Supreme Court’s most radical step toward substantive
welfare rights was not in any sense a Warren Court decision. This was
Justice Powell’s opinion in Youngberg v. Romeo (1982), holding that
treatment of a disabled child in state custody on a paternalistic rationale
must be “based on a professional judgment.” Although formulated in the
relatively uncontroversial context of people in state custody, it had the
potential to be applied more broadly, and in some respects it has been. It
seems an important step in the “soft process” approach to welfare rights
that has been developed especially in Canada and South Africa.14
III. Post-Warren Court Approaches and Democracy
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Courts evade questions of substantive justice, not only because
of ideological bias, but also because of theoretical limitations. In
particular, they shrink from the formidable problem of line-drawing that
substantive justice values seem to present. Even among those who agree
in principle on such matters, there is nothing approaching consensus on
how one determines “minimum needs” or fair punishment or reasonable
group access to positions of privilege. Once such standards were
articulated, experience would require their frequent revision and
adjustment, and courts have neither the mandate nor the qualifications to
undertake such tentative and exploratory norm-setting. Thus, it has
seemed inevitable to many that the courts would shrink from direct
engagement with substantive justice.
In fact, however, a distinctive approach that avoids these
problems emerged in the 1990s in the United States and the European
Union. In the U.S., it is exemplified in the area of race by the “new
accountability movement” in education, including the No Child Left
Behind Act, and by the proactive “benchmarking” practices in
employment discrimination compliance; in the area of criminal justice,
by the reforms inaugurated in the name of the “innocence movement”
and by settlements in various police abuse cases; and in welfare, by
“evidence-based” social work and innovative forms of supervision that
were especially visible in some litigation-induced reforms in the child
welfare area, and analogous developments in environmental and health
and safety regulation..15
In the “experimentalist” approach, courts avoid the problems of
line-drawing by refusing to draw them. Instead, they induce relevant
stakeholders to draw them collaboratively in a more open, disciplined,
and reflexive process than would otherwise occur. The stakeholders
define the goals of the effort, including fairness aspirations; at the same
time they define processes and measures for ongoing assessment of
progress toward their goals, and for revising them in the light of
experience. Some of the key elements of the approach are:
-- Judicially-defined “penalty defaults” that, instead of specifying
what the defendants must do, prescribe what will happen if defendants
fail to negotiate a resolution with the plaintiffs
-- Monitoring processes and indicators that prescribe how
progress under the negotiated regime will be assessed
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-- Proactive error detection processes that treat instances of
noncompliance diagnostically as symptoms of systemic problems rather
than as “trouble cases” to be resolved in isolation
-- Transparency requirements that open the regime to ongoing
participation by the plaintiffs and to more general public scrutiny
-- Minimum performance standards based on observed actual
performance among governmental actors in comparable situations
-- Duties to reconsider and revise goals and processes in the light
of experience.
Many of the regimes that reflect the "new governance" view have
been established by statute or regulation, but some have emerged from
institutional reform litigation. Moreover, there is arguably an underlying
conception of constitutional right implicit in all of them. At the most
general level, the core right is an entitlement to have one's interests in
some area of public responsibility or activity considered in a process that
is responsive and accountable.
"Responsive" implies respectful
consideration of the relation of the claimant's interests to the relevant
public purposes by qualified decisionmakers with at least minimal
participation by the claimant.
"Accountble" implies a reasoned
explanation by the decisionmakers, review of decisions in ways that
provide rich assessments of both individual cases and the system as a
whole, and transparent procedures of systemic self-assessment and selfcorrection.
The prima facie case of a violation of this type of public law right
is a showing of, first, the state's chronic failure to meet relevant standards
of performance in the area, and second, immunity of the system to
conventional forces of political correction. The remedy that follows
from a finding of liability is not a judicially-imposed code, but a judicial
order that the system negotiate and implement with the claimants and
other stakeholders a reform program that is accountable.
Such efforts are linked to those of the Warren Court in their
concern for the well-being of disadvantaged people; in their general
aspiration to reduce racial subordination, police abuse, and oppression
and incompetence in welfare provision; and in their grounding in an
ambitious conception of democracy. But in many respects these
developments seem to break with the Warren Court.
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Considered as jurisprudential phenomena, new governance
regimes seem less legalistic, or at least differently legalistic, than the
Warren Court.
New governance regimes seen less prone to formalism in three
respects. They tend to derive conduct standards, not analytically from
text or consensus, but experimentally from observations of actual
performance under experimental conditions. Moreover, they focus the
attention of officials and stakeholders on governing purposes and
appraise their performances in terms of their success in achieving those
purposes. And their interpretations are explicitly provisional and
contestable.
The new governance approach shares with the Warren Court an
ethical individualism that values personal dignity and aspires to respect
and accommodate "difference". But its institutional architecture seems
less individualistic. It is less focused on resolution of individual claims.
It sees fair process as requiring, not just fair claims resolution, but also
audit processes that sample across the program even where beneficiaries
have not complained. Moreover, it insists that findings of errors be
treated, not only as grounds for individual relief, but as systems of
potential systemic malfunctioning. .
The newer systems are explicitly proceduralist, but in different
ways than the Warren Court. First, the Warren Court's proceduralism
was focused largely on the legislative process and the process of
individual adjudication. In effect, it tacitly accepted the traditional
liberal separation of enactment and enforcement. Rules get made in the
legislature and applied in adjudication. Adjudication is backwardlooking in the sense that it measures compliance in terms of fidelity to
previously announced rules. But in new governance, the key focus is on
on-going processes of elaboration, assessment, and correction.16 These
processes are not strictly legislative. They do produce rules or
interpretations of rules, but the rules are intended to be revised far more
quickly and easily than conventional legislative and administrative rulemaking processes contemplate. And while, they do sometimes focus on
particular cases, they cases are treated diagnostically as evidence of
systemic performance.
Moreover, the range of public action to which the new regimes
apply their proceduralism is considerably different than that of the
Warren Court. The new regimes treat procedurally both issues that the
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Warren Court treated substantively and issues that the Warren Court
treated as non-justiciable. The Warren Court struggled to derive
substantive norms on such matters as the permissibility of racially
exclusionary practices or the reasonableness of search-and-seizures. At
the same time, it treated as non-justiciable or left unregulated such
matters as the adequacy of education or welfare benefits or the
proportionality of punishment and prosecutorial discretion. The new
regimes address all these issues procedurally, inducing and enforcing
requirements of participation, transparency, monitoring, and selfcorrection.
Some of these new regimes originate in legislative initiatives;
some originate in court cases. All of the problems they address seem
susceptible to judicial intervention designed to induce the types of
procedures the new regimes involve. Such procedures might form the
basis of a conception of constitutional welfare rights. Indeed, one way of
interpreting the South African Constitutional Court's much-admired by
quite vague cases on housing and medical care rights is as a step toward
an experimentalist conception.
Finally, Horwitz has shown that Warren Court jurisprudence rests
on a vision of democracy. It remains to ask how contested or contestable
this conception is. Horwitz situates Warren Court democracy in the
American Progressive tradition, broadly understood. Is it the only
important conception of democracy (important either in the historical
sense of influential or in the normative sense of worthy of respect) within
that tradition? My view is that it has a rival, and that the rival is implicit
in the new governance regimes.
The Warren Court conception of democracy is in the tradition of
John Stuart Mill or Jurgen Habermas. Its rival is in the tradition of John
Dewey. Both conceptions emphasize a robust civil society and a fair
electoral process. However, they differ along two dimensions.
First, Mill and Habermas insist strongly on the separation of
politics and administration. For them, the broadest form of popular
political participation is the indirect kind that occurs through debate and
agitation in the civil sphere; direct participation is limited to voting.
They appear to identify more direct forms of participation with anarchy
or clientalism. The distinction between politics and administration is
foreign to Dewey. Dewey, however, never elaborated how popular
participation in administration could occur in a disciplined, accountable
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manner. The new governance regimes of the post-Warren Court years
substantiate Dewey's abstract intuition with concrete examples of how
this might be accomplished.17
A second axis of difference concerns the role of consensus.
Warren Court jurisprudence is rooted in constitutional text and
background social consensus. Like Mill and Habermas, it treats
consensus as an end-point or at least a resting point. In contrast, Dewey
urges that consensus be treated as a set of hypotheses that require testing.
Indeed, the most central concern of Deweyan politics is the tendency of
shared understandings that originally summarized experience to congeal
in ways that blind people to new experience. A Deweyan democracy
thus needs institutions that challenge and destabilize consensus. Again,
the new regimes give concreteness to this idea.
IV. Conclusion
As matters of both history and progressive politics, it is a
important to assess the extent to which the vices of legalism can be
found in the Warren Court's jurisprudence and the extent to which these
vices contributed to the failures of its doctrines. In this effort, the recent
"new governance" regimes are a useful heuristic. They offer a contrast
that brings out some distinctive features of the Warren Court's approach.
And some may conclude that they illustrate an approach that transcends
some of the limitations of Warren Court legalism.
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